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Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) documents are increasingly used as a vector for 
targeted attacks. Although there exist a number of tools and methodologies for 
performing content-level analysis to identify unwanted or malicious behavior or 
characteristics in these documents, these forms of analysis are hampered by increasingly 
complex obfuscation techniques and usually require execution of potentially malicious 
code. This thesis proposes a static analysis method that uses structural elements of PDF 
documents to identify the tools used to generate them. This method may be used to 
attribute malicious PDFs to particular toolkits. 
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The Adobe Portable Document Format is a widely-used format for online 
document interchange. Roughly 23.4 % of the 986,278 documents in the NPS Govdocs1 
corpus consists of PDF documents [1]. A wide variety of tools can, either as part of their 
core functionality or as an add-on, read or write PDF documents. It is the PDF format’s 
very ubiquity that has made it a tempting vehicle for targeting vulnerable applications. 
In 2012, Symantec reported that 11% of all targeted attacks involved exploits 
against PDF-rendering applications, a figure that does not include non-targeted, 
opportunistic attacks [2]. Figures from F-Secure for 2008–2010 indicate that anywhere 
from 28–61% of targeted attacks involved PDF exploits, with a steadily increasing trend 
[3], [4]. In the last quarter of 2012 alone, Microsoft reported more than a 100% increase 
in the number of detected attacks that used vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader and Adobe 
Acrobat to execute malicious Javascript payloads [5]. The mechanisms for the most 
common of these attacks are detailed in Chapter II, Section A. 
In order to better profile the authors behind these attacks, there is interest in 
identifying the tools that they are using to create their malicious PDF documents. If an 
attacker uses an uncommon or custom tool,  and that tool’s signature can be identified in 
a document, regardless of the particular content or possible exploitation mechanisms and 
payloads, it may be possible to more easily identify potentially-malicious documents or 
attribute documents to a common source. Analysis of in-band, PDF-specific metadata, 
such as the reported creating program, can be insightful, but metadata can also be deleted 
or modified with various tools [6].  
This thesis will attempt to identify a method for identifying the toolkits used by 
content authors to generate PDF documents. This will include benign documents. It will 
not attempt to identify signatures of particular exploits or malicious content, and will, to 
the greatest extent possible, avoid using signatures that are based on user-provided 
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content or easily-modified data, such as document-provided metadata. Additionally, any 
selected methods should be fast enough to support real-time analysis. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of 
PDF document forensics. The second explains background information useful to 
understand the structure of PDF documents, as well as related prior work. The third 
chapter describes the experimental methodology for identifying and classifying these 
documents. The fourth discusses results from the identification and classification process 
and gives a conclusion for the thesis. Finally, the fifth chapter addresses possible 




A. PORTABLE DOCUMENT FORMAT 
The Adobe PDF standard was first released in 1993, coinciding with the release of 
Adobe Acrobat 1.0 [7], [8]. Each release of the standard has been backwards compatible 
with prior releases, allowing a PDF 1.5-compliant reader to open a PDF 1.5-, 1.4-, 1.3, 
1.2, 1.1, or 1.0-compliant file, and so on. Releases have added new supported features, 
such as encryption, embedded images, forms, or digital signatures. In 2008, the eighth 
release of the PDF standard, PDF 1.7, was codified as the ISO  standard ISO 32000–1 [9, 
10]. There are further specialized extensions to the standard, such as PDF/A [11], PDF/E, 
and PDF/X, which are intended for archival, engineering, and graphics interchange 
purposes, respectively. Adobe has continued to add features to the PDF format outside of 
the ISO standard, in the form of supplements [12].  
A canonical PDF documents is composed of four main sections, a header, the 





Figure 1.  The four major sections of a PDF document 
The header contains the version number of the PDF standard that the document 
uses, in the format “%PDF-<version_number>,” and is followed by a newline character 
(see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  An ASCII representation of the first 80 bytes of a sample PDF  
document, including the document header and the beginning of an  
indirect object and stream. 
The body of the file contains a sequence of objects that define the content and 
appearance of the document. There are two types of objects: direct objects and indirect 
objects. Direct objects are unlabeled primitives that cannot be referred to by other 
objects, and are similar to literal values present in other programming languages. Indirect 
objects are labeled in such a way that other objects can refer to them. Indirect objects 
appear in the file preceded by an object number, a generation number, and the keyword 
“obj,” and are terminated with the keyword “endobj” (see Figure 3). The object number 
and generation number are used to uniquely identify objects. Generation numbers identify 
the version of an object, and initially start at 0, growing as large as 65,535 as an object is 
updated or reused. This functionality is intended to allow a program to deallocate an 
object’s memory space, and then place new content in its place, to avoid having to 
rewrite an entire file for small updates. 
 
Figure 3.  A sample PDF indirect object, object 1, generation 0, of the type “Pages,”  
which includes a field, “Kids,” with an indirect reference to generation 0 of  
object 6, and a field, “Count,” equal to 1. 
Indirect objects may contain embedded direct objects, such as strings, streams of 
arbitrary binary data, and numeric values, or references to other indirect objects. These 
objects may contain dictionaries of fields that describe aspects of the object, such as its 
type, hierarchical relationships to other objects, font definitions, or displayed contents. A 
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record of recognized object types is maintained by Adobe, and new types must be 
registered through them. 
Data stored in streams may be encoded or encrypted through the use of filters. 
Filters support a variety of transformations, such as mapping binary data to a 
hexadecimal representation, or a number of compression schemes. Additionally, content 
may be encoded using any of several encryption algorithms, such as RC4, DES, 3DES, or 
AES. The format also supports PKI mechanisms to protect or authenticate content. These 
filter mechanisms only apply to complex content and not to primitive numbers, Boolean 
values, or entire objects, except for objects that appear in object streams. Object streams 
are a type of stream, introduced in PDF 1.5, which allows for objects to be grouped 
together, with the goal of allowing more efficient compression of large numbers of 
objects. 
The cross-reference table allows PDF parsers to quickly locate indirect objects 
within a document. It begins with the keyword “xref” and can contain multiple 
subsections, each beginning with a line containing the number of the first object and the 
number of objects in the subsection. Each following line, one per object in the subsection, 
includes a 10-digit byte offset into the file, a five-digit generation number, and either the 
character ‘f’ or ‘n’, indicating whether the object defined on that line is either free or in 
use, respectively. The space occupied by free objects may be reused when new content is 
added to a document, instead of appending the new object to the end of the document. 
The first object in the cross-reference table is always free and has the largest possible 
generation number, 65,535 (see Figure 4). Further cross-reference tables can be defined 
as indirect objects, with the type “XRef.” 
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Figure 4.  A sample PDF cross-reference table, with one subsection and 15 items 
The final section of a PDF document is the trailer. This section begins with the 
keyword “trailer,” immediately followed by a dictionary containing information about 
how to start constructing the document. Required keys include the size of the cross-
reference table and the root of the document’s catalog. Following the “startxref” keyword 
is the byte offset into the file of the cross-reference table. The final line contains the 
keyword “%%EOF” (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.  A sample PDF trailer section 
It is possible for a document to contain multiple trailers and cross-reference 
tables. In this case, the trailer dictionary will contain a key, “Prev,” which points to the 
offset of the previous cross-reference tables. This usually happens when an application 
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makes incremental updates to a document, allowing it to add material without altering 
earlier content, by chaining together cross-reference and trailer sections. 
The PDF specification does not specify the order in which indirect objects should 
appear in a document, physically or logically, with the exception of Linearized” PDFs. 
These are documents whose internal representation has been ordered in such a way that a 
reader may begin to render the document before it has been fully parsed or loaded, 
typically by including objects with content that appears earlier in the document closer to 
the beginning of the file. Additionally, these documents contain “hint tables,” which 
provide a reader application with information about where objects exist within the file, 
before reading a cross-reference table, allowing the reader to locate objects that may have 
already been loaded or request out-of-order portions of the document from the backing 
storage device. The only ordering requirement for Linearized PDFs is that an object 
containing a linearization parameter dictionary must appear in the first 1024 bytes of the 
document. This dictionary object contains  basic information about the document, such as 
the location of the hint tables and number of pages, and serves as an indicator to reader 
applications that they are opening a Linearized PDF without having to process more than 
the first 1024 bytes. 
The elements of PDF documents described in this section are taken from the most 
current PDF specification. However, many readers, including Adobe’s products, will 
accept documents as valid that do not conform to the specification. For example, some 
readers will accept documents which entirely omit the cross-reference section in lieu of 
cross-reference objects, or which contain no trailer section, both of which are described 
as elements of a canonical PDF document. The PDF specification indicates that the 
keyword “%%EOF” must be the final element on a valid document, but, in an appendix 
to the PDF 1.7 specification, Adobe indicates that their products will validate a document 
if the keyword appears anywhere in the final 1024 bytes. As a result of these 
acknowledged inaccuracies in the specification’s implementations, the validity of a PDF 
document is perhaps not best described in terms of how well it adheres to the 
specification, but in whether or not Adobe Reader will open it. 
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Logically, the root of a PDF document is the document catalog. The document 
catalog is an indirect object containing rendering information such as dictionaries of 
pages, supported extensions, forms, layout information, metadata, tables of contents, and 
actions that are performed when a document is opened. The extensions dictionary is the 
vehicle by which non-ISO updates are supported to add new features. 
Most attacks involving a maliciously-crafted PDF document leverage flaws in a 
reader application’s implementation of specific content handlers. For example, an 
attacker may embed a JPEG or TIFF image that exploits a vulnerability in the handler for 
those image types. Since PDF 1.3, Javascript may be embedded in PDF documents, and 
many reader applications, including Adobe’s Acrobat line of products, include an 
embedded Javascript engine [13], [15]. The inclusion of Javascript not only provides an 
additional attack surface for adversaries, but also a rich API for interacting with the 
system, beyond what is normally possible for a PDF document. A document may specify 
actions that are to take place automatically when it is opened, or upon certain user 
actions, such as clicking a button or entering text into a form. These actions may include 
the execution of Javascript or system commands. Some applications notify users of these 
actions, or require confirmation, but this is often poorly implemented, and it may be 
possible to use social engineering to convince users to permit these behaviors [16]. 
B. RELATED WORK 
There is little work dedicated to non-content-based analysis of PDF documents, 
but there are a number of tools and methodologies intended to perform content-level 
analysis. Smutz and Stavrou developed a means to identify malicious content in PDF 
documents through structural analysis [17]. Additionally, they were able to further 
classify attacks involving these documents as either broadly-distributed opportunistic 
attacks, or targeted attacks. However, their approach is intended to identify malicious 
behaviors and signatures, and not to identify or classify toolkits used to create the 
documents. 
There is a large body of work on authorship identification in documents, but most 
of the work focuses on analyzing human languages in plain-text documents, which is not 
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particularly well-suited to the binary content in PDF documents. Frantzeskou et al. 
developed an approach, called SCAP, which uses binary n-gram analysis to identify 
human authors of compiled programs written in a variety of programming languages 
[18]. However, this approach is highly dependent on the programming language being 
profiled, and it is unknown how effective it may be against the PDF specification 
language, or how it may interact with embedded content, such as images, which may 
appear in a PDF document. Additionally, we were not certain if these approaches could 
be desensitized enough to provide coarse enough results, which would be resistant to 
changes caused by human-provided input and content.  
More closely related is work by Rosenblum et al., related to analyzing compiled 
programs to identify their compilers [19]. Their approach identifies idiomatic instruction 
sequences particular to each compiler and uses the sequences to fingerprint the compiler. 
However, their methodology depends on disassembling binaries from arbitrary byte-
offsets, and it is unclear if it could be adapted to work with similar analysis of PDF files. 
Most PDF tools are intended to process or manipulate the content of a document, 
and only a few tools exist that are intended to inspect the structure of PDF documents. 
Pyew is a Python-based tool for statically analyzing a variety of file formats, including 
PDFs [20]. Although Pyew does offer some support for structural analysis, it is best 
suited for extracting and analyzing content from PDF objects. Jose Esparza’s Peepdf tool 
also offers similar capabilities for PDF documents, and can generate a representation of 
the logical structure of a document [21]. Oragami-pdf offers similar features, in addition 
to content modification capabilities [22]. However, both Peepdf and Oragami-pdf are 
limited to inspecting the logical structure of a document, and not the actual ordering of 
structural elements as they appear in the raw file Didier Stevens has produced a number 
of tools intended for analyzing PDF documents, as well as documentation on analysis and 
obfuscation techniques, largely with a focus on identifying potentially malicious 
documents [23], [24], [25]. 
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III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
A. ENVIRONMENT 
Our experiments were conducted in a VMWare virtual machine running 32-bit 
Fedora 16 with one GB of RAM, running on a host with four GB of RAM and a 1.66Ghz 
Intel Atom processor.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Document Generation 
We generated 57 documents using nine tools (see Table 1) with a variety of 
settings and inputs to serve as a training set, against which to build and test signatures.  
Authoring Tool Operating System 
AbiWord 2.8.6 [26] Fedora 16 
Adobe Acrobat XI Professional [27] Windows 8 
FreePDFConvert.com [28] Web-based 
LibreOffice 3.4  340m1(Build:602) [29] Windows 8 
Microsoft Office 2007 SP3 [30] Windows 8 
Neevia [31] Web-based 
Nitro Pro 8 [32] Windows 8 
PDFOnline [33] Web-based 
WordPerfect X6 [34] Windows 8 
 
Table 1.   Software used to generate sample PDF documents 
The documents were generated with one page of text, two pages of text, or 
embedded images. We created this content natively with some tools, but other tools 
converted a pre-existing document into a new PDF document (see Table 2). In the case of 
native functionality, we typed content or inserted images directly into the tool, then saved 
the document as a PDF file. When using a tool to convert a DOCX [35] file into a PDF, 
we created an intermediate DOCX file using Microsoft Office 2007. When a tool 
supported importing a PDF document, the PDF generated by Microsoft Office was used 
as input. One of the evaluated tools, Nitro Pro 8, supported plaintext ASCII files as input.  
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Authoring Tool Content Generation 
Methods 
AbiWord  Native (text only) 
Adobe Acrobat Native, import from PDF 
FreePDFConvert.com  Import from DOCX 
LibreOffice  Native 
Microsoft Office 2007 Native 
Neevia  Import from DOCX 
Nitro Pro 8  Native, import from DOCX, 
import from ASCII plaintext 
PDFOnline  Import from DOCX 
WordPerfect X6  Native, import from PDF 
 
Table 2.   Software content generation options used 
Several tools included additional output options, beyond their default settings. We 
tested several of these output options (see Table 3). The most common among these 
include “optimized” or “minimum” formats, referred to in the Adobe PDF Reference as 
Linearized PDF. The next common output option was to create PDF/A-compatible 
documents. PDF/A documents use a subset of the features in normal PDF documents, and 
must embed all resources, such as fonts, into the document, that might normally be 
expected to be provided by the host system. Finally, Adobe PDFMaker [36] is a generic 
printer driver plugin that allows software without native PDF-generation capabilities to 
produce PDF documents through their print functionality. It is installed as a part of the 
Adobe Acrobat XI Professional suite. 
Authoring Tool Output Formats 
AbiWord  Default 
Adobe Acrobat Default, Optimized, PDF/A 
FreePDFConvert.com  Default 
LibreOffice  Default, PDF/A 
Microsoft Office 2007 Default, Minimum, PDFMaker 
Neevia  Default 
Nitro Pro 8  Default 
PDFOnline  Default 
WordPerfect X6  Default 
 
Table 3.   Software output methods and options used 
 13
Additionally, we downloaded 5267 PDF documents from the Govdocs1 corpus 
[37] to serve as real-world examples. These documents were used to test structural 
signature generation performance on a larger and more complex set of documents than 
the ones that we generated for training purposes.  
2. Structural Signature Generation 
We developed two methods for generating structural signatures for PDF 
documents. Both methods generate a series of tokens, representing an ordering of the 
types of all of the indirect objects within a document. For convenience, we represent this 
series as a comma-delimited list (see Figure 6). The tools for both methods produce a list, 
in this format, as output, which is later used as input for our classification tools. For 
development purposes, these structural signatures are created once and saved separately 
from the original document, so that, while testing classification tools and methodologies, 
the signature did not need to be regenerated each time. 
  
Figure 6.  A sample PDF structural signature 
The first method leverages Didier Stevens pdf-parser.py tool [23] to parse a PDF 
document and identify indirect objects. Pdf-parser.py accepts a PDF document as input 
and produces a listing of object information or document statistics, or extracts the 
contents of objects. We process the object listing of a document to generate an ordered 
set of object types, as they appear in the file. We refer to this method later in this 
document as Method #1. Code for this method is located in Section A of the Appendix. 
The second method scans the raw content of a PDF document with a regular 
expression to identify instances of the keyword “Type,” and extracts the object type 
following the keyword, using a Python program. We refer to this method later in this 
document as Method #2. Code for this method is located in Section B of the Appendix. 
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Timing information for both methods was obtained by using the total execution 
time from the Linux “time” command while generating signatures for our simple 
generated files, the entirety of our sample from the NPS Govdocs1 corpus [37], and a 
smaller subset of 969 documents from the NPS corpus. This subset was chosen by 
grouping documents from the larger sample by their metadata-indicated creator, and 
selecting the largest group. 
3. Developing Structural Signature Classifiers 
a. Regular Expressions 
By comparing the structural signatures of our training documents, grouped 
by the tools that were used to create them, we visually identified unique patterns or 
positions of elements common only to that tool. These patterns were represented as 
regular expressions. As additional classifiers were built, it became necessary to refine 
some regular expressions in order to prevent false positives. Some tools required multiple 
regular expressions in order to capture the signatures of their output. 
b. N-gram Analysis 
Word n-grams of various sizes were extracted from the structural 
signatures, and used to build a simple profile for each of the authoring tools. N-grams are 
sequences of tokens, in this case, of structural elements, of arbitrary length, n. To build a 
profile, we calculated the probability of a given n-gram appearing in all of the n-grams 
associated with one tool (see Table 4). This was repeated for all n-gram lengths less than 




















Table 4.   Sample n-gram scores for documents generated with  
LibreOffice, with n-grams of size two 
4. Classifying Document Structures 
a. Regular Expressions 
After creating regular expressions for each tool, we could test their ability 
to accurately classify documents that were created by the tools. Our script, 
classifyStructure.py (see Section C of the Appendix), accepted a comma-delimited list of 
structural elements as input, as generated by our signature-generation tools, then tested 
the input against each regular expression. If a regular expression matched the input, we 
output the respective matching program as a possible match. For the best possible 
accuracy, we allowed the possibility of multiple matching programs. 
b. N-gram Analysis 
Given an unknown sample, we extracted n-grams of the same size as those 
used to generate the profiles. For each extracted n-gram that matched an n-gram in our 
profiles, we added the score for each associated tool to a running total for each tool. After 
examining all n-grams in the sample, we returned the highest-scoring program as  
the most likely tool to have created the unknown sample (see Tables 5 and 6. Five-fold 



















Abiword  0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200  1.000
PDFOnline     0.095          0.095
LibreOffice     0.115       0.115  0.231
Nitro        0.095       0.095
Neevia              0.152  0.152
FreePDFConvert              0.029  0.029
Table 6.   Sample classification scores for the sample document in Figure 6.   
using n-grams of size two, indicating that the tool most likely used to  




IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESULTS 
1. Signature Generation 
Both signature generation methods had advantages and disadvantages. The first 
method took more time to generate a signature, up to tens of seconds, on average (see 
Tables 7 and 8), but generated more reliable output that is more closely indicative of what 
a PDF reader program will actually recognize as indirect Type tokens. The second 
method was significantly faster, but may generate incorrect signatures if the keyword 
“Type” appears in a context where it does not indicate an indirect object’s type, or if it 
exists in an invalid object that is not referenced by a cross-reference table. Additionally, 
some embedded direct objects contained type definitions, but these objects were not 
extracted by the first method. In our training set, these variations appeared regular and 
predictable, so we were able to make small changes to our regular expression-based 
identifying fingerprints to account for the differences with no loss in accuracy.  
 
Number of files Generation Method  Total Time Average time (per file) 
58    
 Parsing (method #1) 1m 14.877s 1.291s 
 Raw (method #2) 0m   0.411s 0.007s 
Table 7.   Time to extract structural signatures for training documents 
Number of files Generation Method  Total Time Average time (per file) 
5267    
 Parsing (method #1) Approx. 3 days  
 Raw (method #2) 3m 21.547s 0.038s 
969    
 Parsing (method #1) 301m25.740s 18.664s 
 Raw (method #2) 0m59.363s 0.061 
Table 8.   Time to extract structural signatures for selected NPS Govdocs1 documents 
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Documents that were created with identical input to different tools produced 
different structural signatures. For example, the documents whose structure is represented 
in Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10.  are visually similar when opened with a PDF reader. The 
structures represented in Figure 7 and Figure 10 were generated from the same document, 
but with method #1 and method #2, respectively. 
 
Figure 7.  A structural signature, generated with method #1, for a sample  
document created with Adobe Acrobat 
 
Figure 8.  A structural signature, generated with method #1, for a sample  
document created with Microsoft Word and saved using Adobe PDFMaker 
 
Figure 9.  A structural signature, generated with method #1, for a sample  
document created with Nitro8 
 
Figure 10.  A structural signature, generated with method #2, for a sample  
document created with Adobe Acrobat 
2. Document Classification 
a. Regular Expressions 
We were able to create regular expressions to classify each of our training 
documents by the tool that created them. One to three object labels was sufficient to 
identify each of our training files with no false positives or negatives. In most cases, a 
single regular expression was sufficient to identify all documents associated with a 
particular tool. Documents created by Nitro Pro 8 carried one of two possible identifying 
signatures, depending on whether they were created natively within the program, or 
imported from another file (see Table 9).  
 
 19
Program Name Regular Expression 
AbiWord 2.8.6 ^Page,.*Catalog$ 




LibreOffice 3.4  
340m1(Build:602) 
^FontDescriptor,.*Catalog$ 




Nitro Pro 8 (native) ^Catalog,.*XObject,.*(?:Outlines|XObject)$
Nitro Pro 8 (converter) ^Metadata,.*Pages$ 
PDFOnline Page,Pages(?:$|,FontDescriptor) 
WordPerfect X6 ^Catalog,.+Pages,Metadata$ 
 
Table 9.   Regular expressions used for classifying fingerprints  
generated with method #1 
Some identifying fingerprints were easy to develop, but others required 
refactoring, as new samples were added, to avoid false classifications. For example, the 
first indirect object in documents generated by Adobe tools, including both Adobe 
Acrobat and PDFMaker, is always a cross-reference table object, or XRef. A simple 
regular expression, identifying a single XRef object at the beginning of a document’s 
structure, was sufficient to identify all Adobe-generated documents, and never falsely 
classified a document that was created by another tool.  
b. N-gram Analysis 
Our n-gram classification process yielded encouraging results against our 
training data for a variety of n-gram sizes. Profiles generated with signatures created with 
method #2 resulted in slightly higher classification accuracy than method #1 when trained 
and exercised against our entire training set (see Tables 10 and 11, and Figure 11). The 
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accuracy of both methods peaked at around 92% for n-gram sizes of between two and 
four elements. Even with an n-gram size of one, accuracy was better than 50%, although 
this may have been an artificiality introduced by our small documents and selection size . 
The reduction of accuracy at higher n-gram sizes was likely due to the limited size of our 
sample documents. For example, no 12-grams exist in a document with only 11 structural 
elements, so we would be unable to train against or classify documents with 11 or fewer 
structural elements. 
 




1 29 0.518 
2 51 0.911 
3 52 0.928 
4 53 0.946 
5 50 0.892 
6 48 0.857 
7 42 0.750 
8 34 0.607 
9 22 0.393 
10 12 0.214 
11 7 0.125 
12 6 0.107 
13 5 0.089 
14 3 0.054 
15 0 0 
 
Table 10.   N-gram classification results against 56 training documents with  
n-grams of size n and signature generation method #1 
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1 34 0.607 
2 52 0.928 
3 52 0.928 
4 52 0.928 
5 48 0.857 
6 48 0.857 
7 46 0.821 
8 39 0.696 
9 32 0.571 
10 23 0.411 
11 13 0.232 
12 8 0.143 
13 7 0.125 
14 5 0.089 
15 2 0.036 
16 0 0 
 
Table 11.   N-gram classification results against 56 training documents with n-grams  
of size n and signature generation method #2 
 
Figure 11.  Graph representing n-gram classification accuracy against 56 training documents 



























Five-fold cross-validation yielded similar results (see Figure 12). The long 
tail is likely due to three documents, which each contained the same 14 indirect object 
sequences. Because of the limited number of training documents that were created with 
some tools, some training sets did not contain documents created by all possible tools, 
resulting in lower accuracy. 
 
Figure 12.  Graph representing n-gram classification accuracy in five-fold cross- 
validation, per-set, for n-gram sizes one through 16 and signature  
generation method #1 
Using n-grams of size four, further analysis was conducted using five-fold 
cross-validation to obtain more specific accuracy information for each program (see 
Tables 12 and 13). The only program that seemed to be classified differently as a result of 
using different signature generation methods was LibreOffice. It is also interesting to 
note that the classification accuracy did not seem to be directly correlated with the 
number of training samples. For example, both AbiWord and Adobe had similar 
classification accuracies, even though our training corpus only had two samples from 
AbiWord, and 14 from Adobe tools. In cross-validation with training partitions that only 
contained one AbiWord-generated document, we were still able to identify another 





















Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5
 23
Software Name  False‐positive  False‐negative  True‐positive  True‐negative 
AbiWord  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
Adobe  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
FreePDFConvert  0.000 0.600 0.400  1.000
LibreOffice  0.000 0.300 0.700  1.000
Microsoft Office 2007  0.062 0.000 1.000  0.938
Neevia  0.020 0.000 1.000  0.980
Nitro  0.000 0.100 0.900  0.800
PDFOnline  0.000 0.300 0.700  1.000
WordPerfect  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
Table 12.   Per-program n-gram classification accuracy for n-grams of size four and  
signature generation method #1 
Software Name  False‐positive  False‐negative  True‐positive  True‐negative 
AbiWord  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
Adobe  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
FreePDFConvert  0.000 0.600 0.400  1.000
LibreOffice  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
Microsoft Office 2007  0.062 0.000 1.000  0.938
Neevia  0.020 0.000 1.000  0.980
Nitro  0.000 0.100 0.900  0.800
PDFOnline  0.000 0.300 0.700  1.000
WordPerfect  0.000 0.000 1.000  1.000
Table 13.   Per-program n-gram classification accuracy for n-grams of size four and  
signature generation method #2 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Our results indicate that PDF document structure may be a reliable means for 
identifying the tool that was used to create a document. Structural fingerprints are harder 
to forge than metadata or content-specific signatures, and would require reordering a 
document’s objects to obfuscate or obscure. Most of the tools that we used to generate 
our training corpus create unique fingerprints that are identifiable in documents 
containing diverse content types. The signature-generation process can be easily scalable 
to support near-real-time analysis.  
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V. FUTURE WORK 
We were able to build reliable identifying fingerprints for a small number of tools 
and content types using documents that we generated (see Table 1). However, given the 
limited sample size and the simplicity of the generated documents, this is not especially 
surprising or useful. It remains unclear if these approaches can scale to the larger sample 
sizes and more complicated documents in such a way that is suitable for real-time 
classification. When we tested our fingerprints against samples from the NPS Govdocs1 
corpus [37], many of our classification results did not match what document metadata 
indicated. It is possible that these documents had incorrect or misleading metadata, or 
that our fingerprints could not be generalized to this collection, but, without information 
about the tools that actually created the documents, we cannot make claims about these 
hypotheses. Additionally, our ability to make strong claims about the effectiveness of our 
methods was limited by small sample sizes for each tool. We leave it to future work to 
build similar fingerprints for other tools and more complex documents.  
Of particular interest are documents that are generated by tools that may provide 
more precise control to users over how a document’s structure is constructed. We did not 
test documents that were generated by tools such as LaTeX or compiled from DVI or 
PostScript. It may be possible for an adversary to evade or forge structural signatures, 
such as the ones explored in this thesis, if the compiler does not leave a signature that is 
distinguishable from user-provided content.  
All of the regular expression-based identifying fingerprints were built by hand 
after visually inspecting the structural signature of each sample documents. This 
approach would likely not scale well in real-world use, as it requires human interaction to 
analyze the structures of each of the training documents in order to identify unique 
patterns and is difficult to convert into a reliably repeatable process..  
Our n-gram-based approach yielded encouraging results against our training data, 
but it is unsure how well the approach scales to larger and more complicated documents. 
The training documents were simple, with no more than 14 indirect objects each. 
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Additionally, we did not take into account the positions of each n-gram within the greater 
structure, which may serve as a more reliable indicator in future work.  
It would also be of interest to examine how resistant both the regular-expression 
and n-gram analysis classification methods are to malicious or targeted subversion of an 
analyzed document’s structure. If a human is able to craft content in a tool which results 
in a radically different signature than other documents which were created by the same 
tool, it may be challenging to accurately classify a document.  
There is room for future work in examining the structure of incrementally-
modified PDF documents. When we used tools which were able to open and modify 
existing PDF documents, the new documents bore the signature of the most recent tool 
that was used to modify the file. However, it is possible for an incrementally-modified 
PDF document to be modified and contain signatures for multiple tools. When examining 
the Govdocs1 corpus, we found very few examples of documents that appeared to have 
been modified in this way, with chained trailers and cross-reference tables, but were 
unable to determine which tools were used to create them. 
We briefly investigated the idea of combining metadata analysis and idiomatic 
artifact identification with our other approaches to identify suspicious or potentially-
subverted documents. If a document’s metadata indicates that it was created with one 
tool, but the structural signature indicates another, it is possible that an author has 
modified their document beyond what the original tool generated.  
During the process of this research, we discovered a lack of large collections of 
PDF documents with known provenance. Although there are resources, such as the NPS 
Govdocs1 corpus, for large numbers of documents found in the wild, we were unable to 
leverage these documents for reliable training purposes because we were unable to verify 
which tools created them without blindly trusting the documents’ metadata. There are, 
occasionally, small collections of documents, associated with a single tool, which are 
intended to demonstrate that tool’s capabilities. It is essential to future work that large 
bodies of PDF documents, from a wide variety of tools, with a variety of content types, 
and of known provenance are available. This corpus should include documents which 
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utilize the full range of capabilities of the PDF specification, such as encryption, forms, 
and  scripted actions, as well as readily comparable documents which were created from 
identical inputs and have similar appearance. Additionally, tools with different modes of 
operation, such as ones which allow native content creation, as well as conversion 
between formats, should be fully explored. 
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A. SCRIPT USED TO GENERATE METHOD #1 SIGNATURES 
(GETSTRUCTURE.SH) 
#!/bin/bash 
# File: getStructure.sh 
# Structural signature generation method #1 
# Uses Didier Stevens’ pdf-parser to extract object names 









# File: getStructure.py 
# Structural signature generation method #2 
# Extracts “Type” values from the input file(s) 






typere = re.compile(“Type\s*\/(\w+)”) 
 
def getStructure(filename): 
    structure = [] 
    with open(filename, “rb”) as fileHandle: 
        data = mmap.mmap(fileHandle.fileno(),0,prot=mmap.PROT_READ) 
        for result in typere.finditer(data): 
            structure.append(result.group(1)) 
 
    return ,.”“join(structure) 
 
if __name__ == “__main__”: 
    for filename in sys.argv[1:]: 
        print(getStructure(filename)) 
 
C. SCRIPT USED TO CLASSIFY STRUCTURAL SIGNATURES WITH 
REGULAR EXPRESSIONS (CLASSIFYSTRUCTURE.PY) 
#!/usr/bin/python 
 
# File: classifyStructure.py 
# Classifies a PDF document by its structure, using provided fingerprints 
 
import sys 




    structure = ,.”“join(structure) 
    structure = structure.strip() 
    guesses = [] 
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    for fingerprint, name in fingerprints.iteritems(): 
        if fingerprint.search(structure) != None: 
            if name not in guesses: 
                guesses.append(name) 
 
    if len(guesses) == 0: 
        print(“Couldn’t classify”) 
    elif len(guesses) == 1: 
        print(guesses[0]) 
    else: 
        print(“-------------Multiple possibilities-----------------”) 
        for guess in guesses: 
            print(guess) 
 
def classifyFile(filename): 
    return classify(getStructure.getStructure(filename)) 
 
 
if __name__ == “__main__”: 
    if (len(sys.argv) > 1): 
        for filename in sys.argv[1:]: 
            classify(map(lambda x: x.strip().lower(), open(sys.argv[1]).readlines())) 
    else: 





# File: StructureFingerprints.py 
# Contains fingerprints for identifying PDF document creators 
# Fingerprints are only for method #1 
 
reFlags = re.I 
 
fingerprintsBase = { 
 
    “^Catalog,.*xref$”:”Microsoft Office 2007+,” 
    “^FontDescriptor,.*Catalog$”:”LibreOffice,” 
    “^Page,.*Catalog$”:”AbiWord,” 
    “^xref”:”Adobe,” 
    “^Page,.*Catalog,Metadata$”:”Neevia,” 
    “^Catalog,.+Pages,Metadata$”:”WordPerfect X6,” 
    “^Catalog,Pages,.+Metadata$”:”FreePDFConvert.com,” 
    “^Metadata,.*Pages$”:”Nitro8-convert,” 
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    “^Catalog,.*XObject,.*(?:Outlines|XObject)$”:”Nitro8-native,” 
    “Page,Pages(?:$|,FontDescriptor)”:”PDFOnline,” 
} 
 
fingerprints = {} 
 
for fingerprint, name in fingerprintsBase.iteritems(): 
    fingerprints[re.compile(fingerprint,reFlags)] = name 
 




from nltk.tokenize import word_tokenize 




trained = False 




 tokens = [] 
 with open(filename,”r”) as infile: 
  tokens = word_tokenize(infile.read().replace(,,”““\n”)) 
 return tokens 
 
def getFileNgrams(filename, ngramSize): 
 return(ngrams(getFileTokens(filename),int(ngramSize))) 
 
# Walk through a path, extracting n-grams from files and associating  
# them with the directory that contains them. E.g., the file  
# ./my_docs/foo/bar.struct would be associated with the program “foo” 
def loadProgramNgrams(ngramSize,basepath=.”/,”normalize=True): 
 programNgrams = {} 
 for root, dirs, files in os.walk(basepath): 
  program = os.path.basename(root) 
  if  program != ‘‘ and program not in programNgrams: 
   programNgrams[program] = {} 
   for filename in files: 
    filepath = os.path.join(root,filename) 
    currNgrams = getFileNgrams(filepath,ngramSize) 
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    for ngram in currNgrams: 
     if ngram in programNgrams[program]: 
      programNgrams[program][ngram] += 1 
     else: 
      programNgrams[program][ngram] = 1 
 
  # Normalize 
  if program != ‘‘ and normalize: 
   totalNgrams = 0 
   for ngram,count in programNgrams[program].iteritems(): 
    totalNgrams += count 
 
   for ngram in programNgrams[program]: 








 ngramCounts = loadProgramNgrams(ngramSize,basepath) 
 for program,ngrams in ngramCounts.iteritems(): 
  print(“{0}:.”format(program)) 
  for ngram,count in ngrams.iteritems(): 
   print(“\t{0} -- {1}.”format(ngram,count)) 
 
def getTrainingData(ngramSize,basepath=.”/”): 
 global trained 
 global trainedData 
 
 # If we have already trained, just return the cached results 
 if trained: 
  return trainedData 
 
 programNgrams = loadProgramNgrams(ngramSize,basepath,normalize=True) 
 ngramProgramScores = {} 
 for program, ngrams in programNgrams.iteritems(): 
  for ngram,score in ngrams.iteritems(): 
   if ngram not in ngramProgramScores: 
    ngramProgramScores[ngram] = [] 
 
   ngramProgramScores[ngram].append((program,score)) 
 
 trainedData = ngramProgramScores 
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 trained = True 
 
 return ngramProgramScores 
 
def  printNgramProgramAssociations(ngramSize,basepath=.”/”): 
 ngramProgramScores = getTrainingData(ngramSize,basepath) 
 for ngram,programs in ngramProgramScores.iteritems(): 
  print(“{0}:.”format(ngram)) 
  for program,score in programs: 
   print(“\t{0} -- {1}.”format(program,score)) 
 
def getScores(ngramSize,unknownSample,basepath=.”/”): 
 ngramProgramScores = getTrainingData(ngramSize,basepath) 
 unknownNgrams = getFileNgrams(unknownSample,ngramSize) 
 programScores = {} 
 
 for ngram in unknownNgrams: 
  if ngram in ngramProgramScores: 
   for possibleProgram,score in ngramProgramScores[ngram]: 
    if possibleProgram not in programScores: 
     programScores[possibleProgram] = 0 
    programScores[possibleProgram] += score 
 
 # Normalize scores back down to between 0 and 1. These aren’t percentages,  
 # but give us a nicer range of numbers to work with. 
 totalScore = 0.0 
 for score in programScores.values(): 
  totalScore += score 
 
 for program in programScores: 
  programScores[program] /= totalScore 
     
 return programScores 
 
def classify(ngramSize,unknownSample,basepath=.”/”): 
 scores = getScores(ngramSize,unknownSample,basepath) 
 mostLikely = ““ 
 topScore = 0 
 # This information is interesting if we care about how close the next-best result is 
 secondScore = 0 
 secondLikely = ““ 
 
 for program, score in scores.iteritems(): 
  if score > topScore: 
   secondScore = topScore 
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   secondLikely = mostLikely 
   topScore = score 
   mostLikely = program 
 
 if topScore == 0: 
  mostLikely = “Unknown” 
  topScore = 1.0 
 return mostLikely 
 
# Check to see if a sample, whose provenance we know, is correctly  
# classified. Returns True if it matches, False if we classified incorrectly 
def validate(ngramSize,unknownSample,basepath): 
 expected = os.path.basename(os.path.dirname(unknownSample)) 
 result = classify(ngramSize,unknownSample,basepath) 
 print(“Expected {}, got {}.”format(expected,result)) 
 if expected == result: 
  return True 
 else: 
  return False 
 
 
if __name__ == “__main__”: 
 import sys 
 if len(sys.argv) > 2: 
  ngramSize = sys.argv[1] 
  trainingLocation = sys.argv[2] 
  files = sys.argv[3:] 
  for filename in files: 
   result = classify(ngramSize,filename,trainingLocation) 
   print(“{:50}: {}.”format(os.path.basename(filename),result)) 
 else: 
  print(“Usage: {} <ngram size> <path to training data> <files to classify 
...>.”format(sys.argv[0])) 
  print(“\tMultiple files may be classified at once”) 
  print(“\tTraining data is expected to be in the following format, under the 
provided path:”) 
  print(“\tProvided path \\”) 
  print(“\t\tname_of_program1 \\”) 
  print(“\t\t\tstruct_file_from_program1_1”) 
  print(“\t\t\tstruct_file_from_program1_2”) 
  print(“\t\t\t. . .”) 
  print(“\t\tname_of_program2 \\”) 
  print(“\t\t\tstruct_file_from_program2_1”) 
  print(“\t\t\tstruct_file_from_program3_2”) 
  print(“\t\t\t. . .”) 
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  print(“\t\t. . .”) 
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